

On Person-Animacy Hierarchy Effects in Chamorro*

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ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the large body of work in minimalist syntax seeking to construct a unified theory of person-animacy restrictions (PARs), or ‘hierarchy effects’ (e.g. [Anagnostopoulou 2005](#), [Nevins 2007](#), [Béjar & Rezac 2009](#), [Stegovec 2019](#), [Coon & Keine 2021](#), [Deal 2022](#)) by investigating one previously understudied PAR: that of Chamorro (Austronesian). I argue that Chamorro’s PAR poses problems for all current theories of PARs, and thus motivates postulating a new theory. Specifically, the paper offers four novel contributions. First, *pace* [Chung \(1998, 2014\)](#), I argue that Chamorro’s PAR is not a language-specific morphological restriction; it should instead be an explanandum on a language-general, unified theory of PARs. The second contribution is to then show that all extant theories of this sort fail, as a function of two properties of Chamorro’s PAR: *voidance under non-canonical agreement* (VUNCA); and most importantly, *1st-person inertness* (1I). VUNCA proves incompatible with all current approaches bar one, *feature gluttony* ([Coon & Keine 2021](#)). 1I, conversely, is incompatible with all extant approaches: it poses a paradox, which I formalise and derive for the first time, for almost all current theories; and the few which avoid this paradox prove independently flawed. Third, to resolve this, I propose a new theory of PARs: *dynamic feature gluttony*. This supplements [Coon & Keine’s \(2021\) feature gluttony](#) with the architecture of *dynamic interaction*, taken from [Deal \(2022\)](#), which gives it the capacity to derive inertness effects. Fourth and finally, I apply *dynamic feature gluttony* to Chamorro, deriving its PAR. These findings have potentially significant implications both for the typology and derivation of PARs.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Person-animacy hierarchy effects

In person-animacy restrictions (PARs), or ‘hierarchy effects’, the (un)grammaticality of a configuration containing two arguments – either an external-internal argument (EA-IA) or internal-internal argument (IA-IA; descriptively, goal-theme) pair – depends on their ‘person’ and ‘animacy’ properties, broadly construed ([Coon & Keine 2021](#): 655). Descriptively, the (structurally) lower argument cannot ‘outrank’ the higher on a ‘person-animacy hierarchy’ (PAH), where PAH is a cover term for

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Person hierarchy	$\{1 > 2 \text{ or } 2 > 1\} > 3$
Animacy hierarchy	human > animate > inanimate
Referentiality hierarchy	pronoun > proper name > common noun

Table 1 Examples of ‘sub-hierarchies’ of the person-animacy hierarchy (Croft 2003: 130).

various ‘sub-hierarchies’ (Table 1). PARs are typically analysed as syntactic (e.g. Rezac 2011: 65-92).

PARs pose a long-standing theoretical challenge in generative syntax. On one hand, the fact that PARs uniformly obey the PAH (never ranking e.g. inanimate > animate or $3 > 1 \setminus 2$; Aissen (1999: 678) favours a *unified theory* of PARs: PARs obey uniform constraints, so should derive from some cross-linguistically uniform mechanism. In minimalist work, this mechanism is typically *Agree*, interacting differently with different arguments’ feature specifications (Anagnostopoulou 2017). However, PARs also show notorious *variation*, particularly in which ‘subsections’ of the PAH they invoke: e.g. *person* restrictions alone have at least six subtypes (Table 2).

Person restriction	Associated person hierarchy
Strong	$\{ 1 > 2 \wedge 2 > 1 \} > 3$
Weak	$1 \setminus 2 > 3$
Strictly descending	$1 > 2 > 3$
Me-First	$1 > 2/3$
A-descending	$2 > 1 > 3$
You-First	$2 > 1/3$

Table 2 Subtypes of person restrictions (Hammerly 2020: 6).

The theoretical challenge is thus to construct a *unified theory* of PARs – and so, *Agree* – which is nonetheless flexible enough to generate all (and only) attested PARs.

1.2 Outline

This paper contributes to this challenge by investigating the understudied PAR of Chamorro, arguing that it has two properties which *undermine* extant theories of PARs, and consequently proposing a new theory, *dynamic feature gluttony*. Specifically, I make four contributions.

Section 2 summarises Chamorro’s PAR. Section 3 argues, *pace* Chung (1998, 2014), that it is not a language-specific morphological restriction; it should instead derive

from a unified, syntactic theory of PARs. This is the paper’s first contribution. [Section 4](#) then demonstrates that extant unified theories are inadequate, because they cannot model two properties of Chamorro’s PAR: *1st-person inertness* (1I) and *avoidance under non-canonical agreement* (VUNCA). All current theories are either incompatible with 1I, or compatible but independently flawed ([section 4.1](#)); and only one theory – *feature gluttony* ([Coon & Keine 2021](#)) – can explain VUNCA ([section 4.2](#)). This is the second contribution. The third ([section 5](#)) is a new theory of PARs, *dynamic feature gluttony*, which supplements *feature gluttony* with machinery to explain 1I – namely, [Deal’s 2022 dynamic interaction](#). I show how this explains 1I/VUNCA in abstract terms; then apply it to Chamorro ([section 6](#)) – the fourth contribution. [Section 7](#) concludes.

2 CHAMORRO’S PERSON-ANIMACY RESTRICTION

Chamorro is an Austronesian language with predicate-initial word-order (default PRED-SUBJ-OBJ) and verbal, adjectival, nominal and prepositional predicates ([Chung 2020](#)). Preverbal particles mark subject/predicate-agreement, and vary with transitivity and mood. Pronominal arguments can be null (obligatorily when triggering person-agreement, optionally elsewhere) or ‘weak’ pronouns (represented as free morphemes, following *ibid*; though [Chung 2003](#) considers them clitics). [Chung \(2020: 87-107\)](#) postulates three morphological cases: ‘unmarked’ (on EAs/IAs/possessors), ‘oblique’ and ‘local’/‘locative’; following [Chung](#), I assume Chamorro is not morphologically or syntactically ergative, *pace* [Sheehan \(2017\)](#).

Chamorro exhibits the person-animacy restriction in (1a), summarised in [Table 3](#) (synthesising [Chung 2014, 2020: 353-360](#)).

		External Argument					
		1EXCL	1INCL	2	3'	3'lexical	0
Internal Argument	1EXCL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	1INCL	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	2	✓	✓	✓	*	*	*
	3'	✓	✓	✓	✓	*	*
	3'lexical	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	*
	0	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 3 Distribution of (un)grammatical EA-IA configurations in Chamorro.

(1) Chamorro person-animacy restriction

- a. The internal argument cannot outrank the external argument on the Chamorro-specific person-animacy hierarchy.

(2) **Chamorro-specific person-animacy hierarchy :**

- a. $2 > 3' > 3'_{\text{lexical}} > 0$
 ('2nd-person > 3rd-person animate pronouns > 3rd-person animate lexical nouns > 3rd-person inanimates')

This can be understood as three overlapping 'sub-restrictions' (Chung 2014, 2020: 353-354), shown in (3), (4), and (5).

- (3) Animacy subrestriction: Inanimate EAs cannot take animate IAs – hence $*0 > > 2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}$; (3a) below exemplifies $*0 > > 3'_{\text{lexical}}$.

- a. **Ha na'-kåti i manenghing i neni*
 3SG.REAL CAUS-cry the cold the baby
 'The cold made the baby cry.' (Aissen 1997: 736)

- (4) Referentiality subrestriction: Lexical EAs cannot take animate pronoun IAs – hence $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 2/3'$ (plus $*0 > > 2/3'$ where 0 is a lexical noun, subsumed under 3a); 4a exemplifies $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 3'$.

- a. **Para u bisita siha si Juan agupa'*
 FUT 3SG.IRR visit them UNM Juan tomorrow
 'Juan is going to visit them tomorrow.' (Chung 2014: 5)

- (5) Person subrestriction: 3rd-person EAs cannot take 2nd-person IAs – hence $*3' > > 2$, exemplified in (5a) (in addition to $*0 > > 2$, $3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 2$ already mentioned).

- a. **Kao ha kuentusi hao antis-di u hanao?*
 Q 3.SG.REAL speak.to you before 3.SG.REAL go
 'Did he speak to you before he left?' (Chung 2014: 5)

Ungrammatical configurations are typically passivised/antipassivised instead (Chung 2014: 7). I now introduce this PAR's two theoretically consequential properties: voidance under non-canonical agreement (VUNCA) and 1st-person inertness (1I).

2.1 Voidance under Non-Canonical Agreement

VUNCA involves three contexts: infinitives; wh-agreement; and 'possessor-agreement' verbs (Chung 2014: 13-15).

- (6) **Voidance under non-canonical agreement:** Chamorro's PAR is voided in (at least some) contexts without canonical subject/predicate-agreement.

In transitive infinitives, subject/predicate-agreement is replaced by *-um-*, and the IA and (null) EA can violate the PAR: e.g. the infinitival embedded clause in (7) has null 3'_{EA} (controlled by *Pai*) and 2_{IA} *hảo*, but is grammatical.

- (7) *Ha chagi si Pai' um-aligão hảo gi giput.*
 3SG.REAL try UNM Pai' INF-look.for you LCL party
 'Pai' tried to look for you at the party.' (Chung 2020: 359)

In wh-movement, canonical subject/predicate-agreement is replaced by what Chung (1994) 'wh-agreement'. In 'subject wh-agreement' (triggered when transitive EAs wh-move), predicates bear only invariant *-um-*, and the PAR is voided: in (8), 3'_{EA} 'who' wh-moves and triggers subject wh-agreement, allowing 3'>>2 to be grammatical.

- (8) *Hảyi um-ayuda hảo?*
 who WH[SUBJ]-help you
 'Who helped you?' (Chung 2014: 14)

'Object wh-agreement' occurs when transitive IAs, certain obliques and certain adjuncts wh-move. Canonical subject/predicate-agreement is replaced by 'possessor-agreement' suffixes, which normally occur only on possessed nouns; the predicate also bears the nominalising-marker *-in-* (for object/oblique wh-movement); and the IA is demoted to oblique (Chung 2020: 496-502). This voids the PAR: in (9), the object-of-transfer (which, in Chamorro, is the oblique argument of verbs of transfer like 'give'; Chung 2020: 254) wh-moves, triggering 'wh-agreement'; consequently, (9) is grammatical, despite having 3'_{lexical-EA} ('Rita') with 2_{IA} ('you') (Chung 2020: 359).

- (9) *Hảfa n<in>a'i-ña si Rita nu hãgu?*
 what <WH[OBJ]>give-3SG.POSS UNM Rita OBL you
 'What did Rita give you?' (Chung 2014: 359)

Finally, the 'possessor-agreement verbs', a small set of mostly psychological verbs which always take 'possessor-agreement' suffixes, also void the PAR, e.g. permitting 3'_{lexical}>>2 in (10).

- (10) *Ti ya-ña hảo i nana*
 not like-3SG.POSS you the mother
 'The mother does not like you.' (Chung 2014: 358)

2.2 1st-person inertness

The second consequential property I term ‘inertness’, and define in (11). 1st-person (singular/exclusive/inclusive) pronouns are ‘inert’ in Chamorro¹: there is an EA-IA person-animacy restriction, whereby different arguments pattern as though ranked asymmetrically (11a); but 1st-person is grammatical in all EA>>IA configurations, with any argument (11b) – hence $2>>1$, $3'>>1$ (12a), $3'_{\text{lexical}}>>1$ (12b), $0>>1$ (12c) and their reverses are all grammatical. A consequence of inertness is that the relevant argument cannot be ranked relative to those arguments which do participate in the PAR. Thus, no ranking of 1st-person on (2) works (Chung 2020: 358): any arguments-X we assume 1 outranks predict $*X>>1$; any arguments-Y outranking 1 predict $*1>>Y$.

(11) **Inertness:** An argument type δ is inert iff:

- a. For some argument types α, β there is a PAR such that $*\alpha>>\beta$, $\beta>>\alpha$ (i.e. β ‘outranks’ α) and;
- b. $\delta>>\alpha / \beta, \alpha / \beta>>\delta$ ²

- (12) a. *Ma ikak yu' gi karera asta i iskuela.*
 3PL.REAL defeat me LCL race until the school
 ‘They defeated me in the school race.’ (Chung 2014: 363)
- b. *Ha li'I' yu' i che'lu-n Antonio gi nigap.*
 3SG.REAL see me the sibling-LNK Antonio LCL yesterday
 ‘The brother of Antonio saw me yesterday.’ (Chung 2014: 605)
- c. *Mamokkat yu' gi hemhum ya ha gua'ding yu' i*
 1SG.REAL.walk I LCL dark and 3SG.REAL trip me the
hayu
 stick
 ‘I walked in the dark and the stick tripped me.’ (Chung 2014: 11)

3 AGAINST MORPHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

The next two sections argue that no current approach to PARs satisfactorily explains Chamorro, beginning with *language-specific morphological approaches*.

¹ Singular/exclusive/inclusive are frequently conflated hereafter, since all pattern identically with respect to ‘inertness’ in Chamorro.

² One might add that, for δ to be nontrivially inert, we need independent reason to expect δ to participate in the PAR, a priori. I ignore this herein, but note that Chamorro does meet this: its PAR is sensitive to 2nd-person, which cross-linguistically typically entails 1st-person should also participate (see below).

This is the strategy of all prior generative work (Chung 1998, 2014), justified largely by 1I and VUNCA (Chung 2014: 10–15). 1I is attributed to a morphological idiosyncrasy, because it contradicts the PAH (1st-person being unrankable) and is typologically rare: PARs generally target *both* ‘local’ (1/2) persons or neither, not just 2nd-person like Chamorro (Clothier-Goldschmidt 2015: fn.1). VUNCA, conversely, supposedly requires a morphological explanation because it entails that the PAR is sensitive to ‘(non)canonicity’ of *morphological agreement*, information which only *morphology* (not syntax) can access.

The only contemporary generative analysis, Chung (2014), implements this using ‘abortive spell-out’. In syntax, the EA/IA Agree with T^0/v^0 respectively; T^0/v^0 ’s features are then ‘shared’ postsyntactically, pooling on v^0 . The PAR *arises in spelling-out* v^0 . PAR-violating configurations trigger ‘abortive’ spell-out rules: these output ‘*’, inducing ungrammaticality – like $*3 > > 2$ in Table 4, which spells out $*3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0 > > 2$. PAR-obeying configurations do not meet the conditions for any abortive rules; they instead trigger non-abortive spell-out rules, like $3_{\text{(singular)}} > >$ (Table 4). 1I follows because abortive rules targeting any $1 > > / > > 1$ configurations are accidentally absent. Infinitives lack agreement with the EA, so never meet the conditions for abortive rules like $*3 > > 2$. Possessor-agreement verbs and wh-agreement (Table 4) trigger ‘specialised’ agreement rules; these precede, so *bleed*, abortive rules, preventing otherwise PAR-violating configurations from triggering ungrammaticality.

Second, morphological accounts are insufficiently predictive. 1I aside, Chamorro systematically obeys cross-linguistic generalisations on PARs: it otherwise perfectly tracks the PAH; and unlike other ‘morphological’ PARs (e.g. Chukchi; Bobaljik & Branigan 2006, obeys the generalisation that PARs are number-insensitive (Nevins 2011). Indeed, while reverse Chamorro’ – with hierarchy $0 > 3'_{\text{lexical}} > 3' > 2$ – is apparently unattested, each of Chamorro’s subrestrictions occurs elsewhere: $*3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0 > > 2$, including inert 1st-person, in Halkomelem and Squamish (Jelinek & Demers 1983); $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 3'$ (albeit as part of a more general ban on all **Nonpronoun > > pronoun*, irrespective of animacy, unlike Chamorro) in Sierra Zapotec (Sichel & Toosarvandani in progress); and $*0 > > 3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}$ in Tzotzil (Aissen 1997). Chamorro’s adherence to these cross-linguistic generalisations can only follow from a language-specific morphological analysis at the *cost of proliferating explanations*. For example, we might assume some constraint in Chamorro’s morphology, ensuring only PAH-violating configurations could possibly trigger abortive spell-out. However, that this same generalisation holds of other languages is then accidental, requiring a separate (non-Chamorro-specific) explanation. Instead, I propose the null hypothesis that these constraints on PARs have a single, unified explanation; so Chamorro’s PAR *should* be unified with other PARs. These other PARs being standardly syntactic, we thus assume a unified, syntactic account of Chamorro.

Chung (2008) rejects this *a priori*, arguing Chamorro’s PAR is *incompatible* with a unified syntactic analysis. Chung’s evidence, however, is flawed; this constitutes my third argument against morphological analyses. First, that 1I is rare and unexplained by extant unified theories hardly discounts a unified analysis *a priori*. Second, Chung’s observation that the arguments participating in the PAR – EAs,

IAs and possessors (see [section 6.2](#)) – are not standardly Case-assigned by the same head, so plausibly are not all accessible to Agree with one head, *contra* many syntactic approaches to PARs, is undermined by her later [2017](#) (283-285) assertion that Chamorro’s EAs/IAs/possessors are all assigned ‘unmarked’ case under Agree, so necessarily equally accessible to any case-discriminating ϕ -probes. Third, the argument that VUNCA disqualifies syntactic analyses because syntax is insensitive to agreement morphology overlooks concomitant *syntactic* properties, which may be the real cause of PAR-avoidance ([section 6.3](#)): e.g. object wh-agreement apparently involves predicate-nominalisation; infinitives lack a ϕ -probe.

I therefore conclude, *pace* Chung, that Chamorro’s PAR does not obviously disfavour a unified syntactic analysis; whereas there *is* reason to disfavour a morphological analysis. This suggests we should pursue the null hypothesis: a syntactic account unifying Chamorro with other PARs.

Type of spell-out rule	Configuration	Spell-out rule
Abortive	$*3 > > 2$	$v^0 \rightarrow *$
		[-Participant] _{subj}
		[-Author, +Participant] _{obj or poss}
Canonical agreement	$3_{(\text{singular})} > >$	$v^0 \rightarrow /ha/$
		[-Author, -Participant, -Plural, -Irrealis] _{subj}
		$[\phi\text{-obj}]$
Non-canonical agreement	Subject wh-agreement	$v^0 \rightarrow /um/$
		[nomWh-Agr]
		[-Irrealis]
		$[\phi\text{-subj}]$

Table 4 Example spell-out rules from [Chung \(2014\)](#).

I give three reasons to disfavour a morphological account, and favour unifying Chamorro’s PAR with other, syntactic PARs instead.

First, [Chung](#)’s encoding ‘*’ as a representational primitive, despite lacking phonological/semantic content, is clearly ontologically dubious; ‘*’ is a diacritic, encoding ungrammaticality by brute force. Note, however, that [Chung](#)’s decision to invoke ‘*’ is not *arbitrary*: it is partly *forced*. This suggests the ontological dubiousness problem may inhere in morphological analyses more generally. Observe that [Chung](#) only needs ‘*’ because she assumes that PAR-violating configurations’ ungrammaticality results from *triggering* a spell-out rule: these rules will consequently need the power to induce ungrammaticality, whence [Chung](#)’s use of ‘*’. A common alternative (e.g. [Wiltschko 2008](#)), which does *not* need ‘*’, assumes PAR-violating configurations’ ungrammaticality results not from *triggering* a spell-out rule, but *failing to trigger one at all*: no spell-out rule is conditioned by (a subset of) the feature-specifications involved in (e.g.) $*3 > > 2$, so none applies, making it a ‘paradigmatic gap’; hence ungrammatical. ‘*’ is then unnecessary. Note, to apply this to Chamorro, no spell-out rule like $3_{(\text{singular})} > >$ in [Table 4](#) can exist: this is conditioned by a subset of the

features of (e.g.) $3'_{(\text{singular})} > > 2$, so would spell it out, making it *grammatical*. Instead, $3' > > 1/2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ all need their own spell-out rules, conditioned by both the EA's/IA's features, to ensure that there is no rule underspecified enough to expone $3' > > 2$. Languages with subject and object agreement require this independently: if subject/object agreement occupy the same head, $3' > > 1/2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ need separate rules, object agreement differing in each. Crucially, since Chamorro lacks object-agreement, *the same assumption is wholly arbitrary*: $3' > > 1/2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ always spell out the same *3rd-person subject/predicate-agreement*. This alternative account is thus undesirable for Chamorro. This is suggestive: not only is Chung's morphological account ontologically dubious, this is arguably partly *forced* by a common, simpler alternative being *unavailable* – disavouring morphological analyses more generally.

4 AGAINST UNIFIED SYNTACTIC APPROACHES

This leads to my second contribution: no current unified, syntactic theory of PARs adequately explains Chamorro.

I divide syntactic theories into two: the traditionally dominant *strictly syntactic* (SS) approaches (e.g. Preminger 2019: 7ff); and *feature gluttony* (FG), a recent alternative (Coon & Keine 2021). In SS approaches, PAR-violations arise inside *narrow-syntax*. The most common implementation (Coon & Keine 2021: 658) is 'failed Agree': PAR-violations arise because an obligatory *Agree* relation between a verbal head and an argument 'fails', being *blocked* by an intervening argument, leaving the former argument 'unlicensed' (understood variously; see e.g. Stegovec 2019), which induces ungrammaticality in syntax/at the point of transfer. *Feature gluttony* is outlined below (section 4.1.2). The following demonstrates the inadequacy of SS and FG approaches by evaluating them against 1I and, briefly, VUNCA. The core problem is 1I: neither SS nor FG approaches derive inertness effects. Almost all theories face a paradox, which I formalise and derive for the first time; and the few others are independently flawed. I then show that VUNCA, too, problematises SS approaches – though not FG. These two findings underpin my proposal, *dynamic feature gluttony*.

4.1 1st-person inertness

4.1.1 Strictly syntactic approaches

First, consider 1I. In addressing SS approaches, I focus on failed Agree (FA) since this is most common, and I know of no alternative approach purportedly capturing inertness anyway. Chung (2014: 11) already notes that 1I poses a paradox for one kind of FA approach, Nevins (2007, 2011), because 1st-person cannot be assigned a feature specification. I generalise this: *because (almost) all FA approaches make assumptions A1/A2 (13)*, they will (almost) all face the same problem, namely that no feature specification works for inert arguments. This is the Inertness Paradox.

- (13) A1: $*\alpha >> \beta$ & $\beta >> \alpha$ (i.e. ‘ β outranks α ’) iff β is more featurally specified than α with respect to some standard S.

A2: An argument’s degree of feature specification with respect to S is constant.

- (14) **Inertness Paradox: Iff**

- (ii) for some arguments α, β , $*\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$, and;
- (iii) A1, and;
- (iv) A2;

then there can be no argument δ which is inert, i.e. whereby $\alpha/\beta >> \delta, \delta >> \alpha/\beta$.

Consider first A1. A1 just formally re-encodes ‘ranking’: the asymmetrical relationship between β/α represented descriptively by ‘ β outranks α , with respect to a person-animacy hierarchy’, is now translated into a different, *formal* asymmetry – ‘ β is more featurally specified than α , with respect to a standard’ (see Oxford 2017: 15-17). I use the theory-neutral term ‘standard’, S, because its precise denotation varies. In Nevins’ approach, for example, S is the set of contrastive and/or marked feature-values which the relevant probe searches for. $*\alpha >> \beta$ obtains whenever β has some feature-[F] from this set, which α *does not also have*; this results in β failing to Agree, leaving β ‘unlicensed’, so ungrammatical. $\beta >> \alpha$ requires that α not have a feature from this set which β lacks. Together, this means that to get both $*\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$ – i.e. for β to ‘outrank’ α – β must have a superset of the features, relative to S, that α has. I take this asymmetrical relationship to amount to β being ‘more featurally specified’ than α ; whereupon, we reach A1. This holds across FA approaches. In approaches like Anagnostopoulou (2005), Pancheva & Zubizarreta (2018: P&Z), the standard differs: it is a set of features on goals which require special ‘licensing’ – e.g. for P&Z, [PROX]/[PART]/[AUTH], depending on which person restriction is involved. Again, $*\alpha >> \beta$ requires β have some feature-[F] from this set which α does not – whereupon [F] cannot be Agreed with and licensed, yielding ungrammaticality; and $\beta >> \alpha$ requires that α not have such a feature (Pancheva & Zubizarreta 2018: 1200ff; Anagnostopoulou 2005: 221).

Accordingly, for $*\alpha >> \beta$ and $\beta >> \alpha$, β must again have a superset of α ’s features relative to the standard – whence, A1. The same holds for Yokoyama (2019: 134-137) and Béjar & Rezac (2009: 43-44), where the standard is the probe’s unvalued feature-set.

These approaches also assume A2, insofar as they have no means of changing either $\alpha/\beta/\dots$ ’s features, or the standard’s features; consequently, $\alpha/\beta/\dots$ ’s degree of feature specification with respect to S cannot change either.

A1/A2 then yield the Inertness Paradox as follows. Given $*\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$, we know that β must, constantly, be more featurally specified than α with respect to the standard; this is what A1 and A2 entail. A further argument δ therefore has three logically possible degrees of specification with respect to the standard, compared to α/β . Crucially, as Table 5 shows, *whichever we assume*, we cannot generate both

Relative feature specification for δ	Corresponding 'ranking' for δ	Unexpectedly grammatical configuration
δ is more featurally specified than both α, β	$\delta >> \alpha$	$\alpha/\beta >> \delta$
δ is less featurally specified than both α, β	$\beta >> \delta$	$\delta >> \alpha/\beta$
δ is more featurally specified than α but less featurally specified than β	$\beta >> \alpha$	$\delta >> \beta,$ $\alpha >> \delta$

Table 5 Possible relative feature specifications for an inert argument δ where $\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$.

$\delta >> \alpha/\beta$, $\alpha/\beta >> \delta$; we always predict some configuration to be ungrammatical, only for it to end up unexpectedly *grammatical*. The same problem arises for Chamorro's 1st-person. Given the PAR, we know that 2 is more featurally specified than 3' relative to the standard, 3' more specified than 3'lexical, etc. Whichever specification 1 then receives – more specified than 2/3'/3'lexical/0 (row 1 in Table 5), less specified (row 2) or intermediately specified (row 3) – some configuration *will prove unexpectedly grammatical*, vis-à-vis our predictions.

Note, given cross-linguistic evidence that 1st-person typically outranks 2nd-person (and always 3rd-persons; Aissen 1999:678), I assume Chamorro's 1st-person (singular/exclusive/inclusive) is really more specified than 2/3'/3'lexical/0; the unexpectedly grammatical configuration is thus 2/3'/3'lexical/0 >> 1.

Understanding the inertness problem this way makes it clear what a theory of PARs which can capture inertness must do: jettison A1 and/or A2. I focus on A2; A1 is more fundamental to current approaches, and abandoning A2 is the only previously pursued approach. Abandoning A2 voids the Inertness Paradox, because it allows for an inert argument's degree of specification with respect to the standard to vary; so for Chamorro's 1st-person, for example, we could assert that 1st-person is more specified than 2/3'/3'lexical/0 when it is an EA (1_{EA}), but that it is not more specified when an IA (1_{IA}); so we predict both 1 >> 2/3'/3'lexical/0, 2/3'/3'lexical/0 >> 1 to be grammatical, avoiding the paradox. We can achieve this, in turn, in two ways. First, by literally allowing the inert argument's properties to vary – i.e., we can *change the goals*. I reject this, absent evidence for any special differences in Chamorro between 1_{EA} vs. 1_{IA} in feature specification, distribution or structural properties (Chung 2020: 173-190).

The second, crucial option is to *change the standard*. Taking Chamorro again, this means that 1_{EA}/1_{IA} themselves have the same properties; but the standard against which 1_{EA} is measured differs in some way from that against which 1_{IA} is measured,

such that both $1_{EA} > >$ and $> > 1_{IA}$ are grammatical. I argue that this makes a fresh cut among theories of PARs: between most theories, which have no ‘standard-changing’ devices of this sort; and two – [Stegovec \(2019\)](#), [Deal \(2022\)](#) – which do. [Deal](#)’s theory cannot produce inertness for independent reasons ([section 5.1](#)). However, [Stegovec](#)’s can; including 1st-person inertness, in the form of an EA-IA person restriction which bans only $*3 > > 2$, making $1 > > / > > 1$ always grammatical and so 1st-person inert. I now review [Stegovec](#)’s system, ultimately arguing that it too cannot model Chamorro.


For [Stegovec](#), pronouns have unvalued person-features. Person restrictions (PRs), like the $*3 > > 2$ PR, arise whenever two pronouns compete to get their person-features valued by a single head; specifically, a single phase-head, since phase-heads bear valued person-features. For EA-IA restrictions like the $*3 > > 2$ PR, this phase-head is v^0 . I now show how [Stegovec](#) derives the $*3 > > 2$ PR using this background, combined with two further assumptions: the ‘addressee-based’ feature-system ([Table 6](#)); and *optional partial feature inheritance*, outlined below.

1st-person	2nd-person	3rd-person
π	π	π
PART	PART	
	ADDR	


Table 6 ‘Addressee-based’ feature-system (adapted from [Stegovec 2019](#)).


First, consider what happens in a derivation without feature inheritance. Here, [Stegovec](#)’s theory is just a variant of all the other FA approaches introduced above. The ‘standard’ is the set of V^0 ’s valued person-features. $*\alpha > > \beta$, or more accurately $*\alpha_{EA} > > \beta_{IA}$, then obtains whenever β_{IA} has some feature from this set which α_{EA} does not also have; this is just like the other FA approaches. More concretely, this situation is ungrammatical because *it simply cannot be generated* on [Stegovec](#)’s system. [Stegovec](#) assumes (for reasons irrelevant here) that α_{EA} is the argument which Agrees with V^0 first, and so gets its person-features valued first. Crucially, because V^0 cannot withhold any person-features, it must give α_{EA} its whole set – (15a) exemplifies this, where V^0 bears $[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{ADDR}]]]$. This in effect sets a ‘ceiling’ on the possible features that any arguments Agreeing with V^0 thereafter can get: if α_{EA} has the full set (and V^0 ’s set never gets any bigger), then all other arguments cannot get any more features. They either get the same set (15b); or, in the event that V^0 ’s feature-set deletes after Agreeing with DP_{EA} then they get fewer (i.e., no) person-features (15c). Consequently, given the feature-system in [Table 6](#), $1/2 > > 3$ (and $1 > > 2$, $2 > > 1$ for additional reasons ignored here) are grammatical; but $3 > > 1/2$ should not be.

(15) a.




b.





Now consider what happens when partial feature inheritance (PFI) does occur. PFI means that a subset of V^0 's *person-features*, namely $[\pi[\text{PART}]]$, (along with its unvalued number-features) are 'inherited' by the phase-head's complement, V^0 ; they are simultaneously deleted on V^0 . Notice, crucially, that this is a form of standard-changing: the locus of the valued person-features has changed, from V^0 to V^0 . This 'new' standard has a crucial difference from the old one: whereas for V^0 the argument that gets its person-features valued first is DPEA, for V^0 it is DPIA. Consequently, using the logic above, when V^0 is the standard, it is not DPEA but DPIA *which sets the 'ceiling' for all other arguments*; so it is now DPIA which can never be less specified than DPEA, not the reverse. As a result, $3 > > 1$ is perfectly grammatical, because DPIA is more featurally specified than DPEA. Concretely, this is derived as in (16): V^0 assigns DPIA $[\pi[\text{PART}]]$, (16a); and then fails to assign anything to DPEA (specifically, because V^0 is assumed to be inaccessible when DPEA merges, having transferred in the lower phase), (16b). In short, the reason that $1 > > 3$ and $3 > > 1$ are grammatical is that they are subject to *two different standards*: in $1 > > 3$, the standard is V^0 , which requires that DPIA never have more features than DPEA – so $1 > > 3$ is fine (but $3 > > 1$ is not); in $3 > > 1$, the standard *has changed* to V^0 , which requires instead that DPEA never have more features than DPIA, whereupon $3 > > 1$ is fine. This permits 1st-person inertness. Notice that $*3 > > 2$ remains ungrammatical, because V^0 never inherits enough features to value DPIA as 2nd-person; so this new standard is effectively unavailable for 2_{IA} , meaning 2_{IA} can only occur when the standard is V^0 – whereupon, $3 > > 2$ is ungrammatical. Hence, a $*3 > > 2$ PR.

(16)



Nonetheless, extending Stegovec's system to Chamorro incurs three major problems. First, Chamorro has a clusivity distinction, so requires a different feature-system from Table 6; Stegovec assumes Table 7. However, given this system, whichever feature specification V^0 inherits cannot work. To ensure that V^0 can value both 3>>1EXCL/1INCL, V^0 must inherit $[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{AUTH},\text{ADDR}]]]$; but since this contains 2's feature specification, 3>>2 is also generated. Preventing 3>>2, however, means that V^0 can inherit maximally $[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{AUTH}]]]$ – whereupon

$3 >> 1\text{INCL}$ also cannot be generated. Fixing this will require an alternative feature-system whereby 2 has some feature not shared with either $1\text{EXCL}/1\text{INCL}$, meaning that V^0 could inherit enough features for both $1\text{EXCL}/1\text{INCL}$ without also being able to value 2. Absent proposals to this effect, Stegovec’s system fails.

1st-person exclusive	1st-person inclusive	2nd-person	3rd-person
π	π	π	π
PART	PART	PART	
	/ \		
AUTH	AUTH ADDR	ADDR	

Table 7 Inclusive/exclusive feature-system (adapted from Stegovec (2019)).

Second, Stegovec explains only *person* restrictions, involving only *weak* pronouns. Unless we assume nonpronouns can also have unvalued person-features, *pace* Stegovec, then Chamorro’s PAR must be disunified: $*3'_{\text{lexical}} >> 2/3'$ and $*0 >> 3'_{\text{lexical}}$ would require a separate explanation, since they involve nonpronouns. Given that these configurations have the same avoidance contexts and inertness properties as the pronoun $>>$ pronoun configurations, this just undesirably proliferates explanations. The third, and ultimately fatal problem, is that *all SS approaches* – including Stegovec’s – are incompatible with VUNCA (section 4.2).

In sum, 1I incurs a paradox for almost all FA approaches; and the remainder ultimately prove inadequate.

4.1.2 Feature Gluttony

I now show that this holds for *feature gluttony* too.


In FG, PARs arise from a combination of two properties (Coon & Keine 2021). First, ‘gluttony’, whereby a probe successfully Agrees with multiple goals. Probes contain ‘segments’, qua unvalued ϕ -features, which each probe independently; they Agree with, copying back the whole relevant geometry (e.g. for person-probes, the person-geometry) of, their most local matching goal. Gluttony then arises, for $\alpha >> \beta$, iff β is able to value some segment which α cannot value – causing the probe to Agree with both α/β . Consequently, a PAR whereby $*\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$ will require both that β value some segment α cannot, and not vice versa; this entails that β has a superset of α ’s segment-valuing features. Otherwise put, β is more ‘featurally specified’ (Coon & Keine 2021: 658).

Crucially, however, gluttony does not necessarily entail ungrammaticality; gluttony causes ungrammaticality only indirectly, downstream in the derivation. This occurs in two ways. First, gluttony can induce ineffability in syntax, by forcing both goals that it has Agreed with to undergo simultaneous cliticisation (ibid:671-672). This does not apply to Chamorro. For one thing, Chamorro’s PAR also applies to

nonpronouns ($*0 > > 3'_{\text{lexical}}, *3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 2/3'$); given nonpronouns never trigger clitic-doubling/agreement, these PAR effects clearly cannot involve ‘simultaneous cliticisation’, modulo stipulation. Even PAR-violations involving weak pronouns, treated as clitics by Chung (2003), apparently do not involve simultaneous cliticisation: the fact that IAs can cliticise even in infinitives (e.g. *hăo*, 7), where the subject/predicate-agreement ϕ -probe is standardly absent, suggests that cliticisation is licensed by a different probe from the subject/predicate-agreement probe. If it is the latter probe that induces EA-IA PARs (as Coon & Keine 2021: 685ff), then again cliticisation cannot be triggering the PAR. Instead, I assume the PAR results from ineffability in *Vocabulary Insertion*. Vocabulary Insertion is subject to the constraints in (17) (Keine, Oxford & Coon 2022: 28).

- (17) a. For every feature value Σ , insert the maximally specific vocabulary item (VI) that is compatible with Σ .
- b. Only one VI may be inserted per head.

A gluttonous probe will have copied back the geometries of two arguments; consequently, it bears two ‘feature values’. For example, H^0 in (18) bears both $[x]$ and $[x[y]]$. Given constraint-(17a), for each of these feature values, we must insert the maximally specific VI. Given the toy VIs in (19), this means for $[x]$ we must insert $/a/$; for $[x[y]]$ we must insert $/e/$. This induces ineffability, however, because inserting both VIs would violate constraint-(17b). Inserting one VI, e.g. a default/underspecified VI, is in turn always prevented by constraint-(17a), since these VIs will always be blocked by the more specific (albeit ineffability-inducing) VIs (Coon & Keine 2021: 688). The head thus cannot be spelled-out – whence ungrammaticality.



- (19) $/a/ \Leftrightarrow [x]$
- $/e/ \Leftrightarrow [x[y]]$

Returning to 1I, if ungrammatical derivations arise from gluttony plus ineffability in Vocabulary Insertion, then grammatical derivations like $1 > > / > > 1$ can arise in two ways: they are grammatical because (i) they do not induce gluttony; or (ii) they do, *but this does not induce ineffability in Vocabulary Insertion*. Consider first option-(ii). Even a gluttonous configuration – say, $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0 > > 1$, if we assume as above that 1 is more featurally specified than $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ – can be grammatical, if some postsyntactic repair operation applies before Vocabulary Insertion: for example, impoverishment could delete the gluttonous probe’s feature values, preventing

them from competing for insertion, and so preventing ungrammaticality. Besides learnability problems, however, this proposal incurs *excessive stipulation*. Chamorro never shows overt object agreement. Yet if $>>1$ is gluttonous, we must stipulate, entirely without positive evidence, that $>>1$ involves covert object agreement; there is some postsyntactic repair – e.g. impoverishment – altering this agreement; and that this operation is somehow prevented from repairing the other gluttonous configurations. I thus reject option-(ii).

Crucially, once we take away the possibility that gluttony is repaired morphologically, we must assume that gluttony entails ungrammaticality: if $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0>>1$ cannot be repaired morphologically, it can only be grammatical if it does not induce gluttony at all (option-(i)). Crucially, however, at this point we *encounter the Inertness Paradox again*, because FG ends up assuming A1/A2. Recall gluttony's distribution: $\alpha>>\beta$ is gluttonous and $\beta>>\alpha$ not, iff β is more featurally specified than α with respect to the probe. If gluttony entails ungrammaticality, then 'gluttonous' in the previous sentence is interchangeable with 'ungrammatical'; whereupon, we simply have A1. Absent goal- or standard-changing machinery, FG must also assume A2. This yields the Inertness Paradox: whichever feature specification 1 has, some configuration is unexpectedly grammatical – if 1 is more specified than any X, $X>>1$ should be gluttonous, so ungrammatical; if any Y is more specified, $1>>Y$ should be.

Thus, neither failed Agree nor FG models 1I: they generally assume A1/A2, incurring the Inertness Paradox; and the few exceptions, like [Stegovec \(2019\)](#), fail independently. Current unified syntactic theories of PARs thus cannot accommodate Chamorro.

4.2 Voidance under Non-Canonical Agreement

I now, briefly, address VUNCA. Focusing on infinitives and subject wh-agreement, I argue that VUNCA reinforces SS approaches' inadequacy, but provides novel support for FG. Thus, though a new theory of PARs is required to explain 1I, VUNCA suggests it should take FG as a baseline.

Consider first infinitives. PAR-voidance in nonfinite clauses is well-attested ([Coon & Keine 2021](#): 622). Standardly, these clauses are assumed to lack the 'high' ϕ -probe involved in subject/predicate-agreement (which I associate with Infl^0 , [section 6.1](#); [Preminger 2021](#): 1. This apparently holds of Chamorro too, since its transitive 'infinitives' lack subject/predicate-agreement, tense-aspect-mood marking and overt subjects, all properties standardly attributed to the ϕ -probe's absence ([Chung 2020](#): 458-460). PAR-voidance in this context follows naturally from FG ([Coon & Keine 2021](#): 673-674): an absent ϕ -probe Agrees with nothing; so gluttony, hence ungrammaticality, cannot arise, even for otherwise PAR-violating configurations. Note, this is not incompatible with SS approaches either: absence of the ϕ -probe is a narrow-syntactic property, so PARs could in principle be sensitive to it. But in practice, at least failed Agree makes wrong predictions: absent a ϕ -probe, arguments necessarily 'fail to Agree', and so should be 'unlicensed' and ungrammatical across-the-board.

Note, claiming that the ‘licensing’ requirement is simply suspended in nonfinite clauses (Preminger 2019) is wholly stipulative.

More significant is subject wh-agreement. I argue that subject wh-agreement is a purely *morphological* phenomenon. That it has no syntactic properties which could explain PAR-avoidance is suggested by the minimal-pair (20)/(21) (Chung 2014: 14-15): respectively, a subject wh-question in realis mood, with wh-agreement; and its irrealis counterpart, which lacks wh-agreement. They show no obvious syntactic differences: word-order and case-marking (‘unmarked’ case on both EA/IA) coincide, and there is no evidence for nominalisation, unlike object wh-agreement. Nonetheless, only (20) voids the PAR, allowing $3' > 2$.

- (20) *Hăyi um-ayuda hăo?*
 who WH[SUBJ]-help you
 ‘Who helped you?’ (Chung 2014: 14)

- (21) **Hăyi para u ayuda hăo?*
 who FUT 3SG.IRR help you
 ‘Who is going to help you?’ (Chung 2014: 14)

Instead, following Baier’s (2018) theory of anti-agreement/wh-agreement cross-linguistically (and Chamorro specifically; Baier 2018: 285, I treat subject wh-agreement as *A’-sensitive postsyntactic impoverishment* (section 6.3). EAs which undergo wh-movement bear both [ϕ]- and [A']-features; when $\text{Infl}^0 \phi$ -Agrees with an EA of this type, it copies both [ϕ]/[A']. This then triggers a Chamorro-specific impoverishment rule, deleting Infl^0 ’s [ϕ] in the context of [A'], yielding ‘wh-agreement’.

Crucially, PAR-avoidance in subject wh-agreement, so-construed, is fundamentally incompatible with all SS approaches: if PARs only arise in narrow-syntax, then postsyntactic impoverishment can never make a difference – so avoidance under subject wh-agreement is wholly unexpected. Conversely, it is straightforwardly expected by FG, since PAR-violations only arise postsyntactically: specifically, impoverishment deletes the ϕ -features of a gluttonous probe before Vocabulary Insertion; there are consequently no feature values left to compete for insertion, preventing ineffability, and so voiding the PAR. Note, avoidance in wh-agreement is an important complement to other recent work arguing that ellipsis – another putative postsyntactic deletion operation – voids PARs; both avoidance effects undermine SS, and support FG.

In sum, no unified syntactic theory of PARs explains Chamorro, because none models 1I; but FG nonetheless has an advantage, its compatibility with VUNCA. This is my second contribution.

5 DYNAMIC FEATURE GLUTTONY

This motivates my final two contributions: a new theory of PARs, *Dynamic feature gluttony* (DFG), capable of deriving both 1I and VUNCA; and an application to

Chamorro. DFG inherits feature gluttony’s compatibility with VUNCA; but, crucially, supplements *feature gluttony* with ‘standard-changing’ technology to explain 1I – namely, Deal’s (2022) *dynamic interaction*.

Below, I introduce dynamic interaction, explaining in abstract terms why it cannot derive 1I in Deal’s (2022) system (section 5.1); but can in DFG section 5.2.

5.1 Dynamic Interaction

Deal (2022) introduces dynamic interaction in an FA theory of PARs, based on the interaction-and-satisfaction Agree model. For Deal, the probe in an $EA \gg IA$ configuration targets IA first; EA is Agreed with only on a subsequent cycle of Agree. Probes bear satisfaction conditions (SAT), determining which goals cause the probe to halt; interaction conditions (INT), determining which goals an unsatisfied probe will Agree with; and *dynamic interaction conditions* ($INT\uparrow$), INT added to the probe during the derivation, under Agree with a goal bearing the relevant feature. In the terminology used above, these SAT/INT($\uparrow$) constitute the ‘standard’. Consequently, $INT\uparrow$ are standard-changing: for $EA \gg IA$, for example, the ‘standard’ qua set of SAT/INT($\uparrow$) against which IA’s feature specification is measured may differ from that against which EA’s is measured, *because $INT\uparrow$ are added to the probe during the derivation*. More generally, this means that one and the same argument – say, Chamorro’s 1 – might be subject to different ‘standards’ when it merges as an EA vs. IA; as above, this is in principle what we need to avoid the Inertness Paradox. Note, $INT\uparrow$ specifically makes the standard stricter: it adds conditions that the second goal must meet, making Agree harder.

The question then arises why, if it is ‘standard-changing’, $INT\uparrow$ nonetheless cannot generate inertness in Deal’s system. This is because $INT\uparrow$ is *the wrong kind of standard-changing*, in the context of a failed Agree approach like Deal’s. Recall that inertness boils down to ‘unexpected grammaticality’. Specifically, whichever feature specification we give an inert argument, there will be some configuration of the form $\alpha \gg \beta$ whereby β is more featurally specified than α with respect to the standard, but which nonetheless ends up grammatical – contrary to our expectations. In an FA theory, the reason we expect configurations of this sort to be ungrammatical is that they should involve an argument failing to Agree; for $\alpha \gg \beta$, on Deal’s theory this argument is α , since α is probed second. Accordingly, in general terms, what Deal’s theory requires is a device for making Agree easier; turning a configuration where α fails to Agree, into one where it succeeds. Here, the problem with $INT\uparrow$ becomes obvious: $INT\uparrow$ makes Agree harder, not easier. Accordingly, $INT\uparrow$ will never turn a non-Agreeing configuration into an Agreeing one. For an FA theory like Deal’s, this means $INT\uparrow$ never turns an ungrammatical configuration into a grammatical one – so cannot generate unexpected grammaticality, and thus inertness. In familiar terminology, Deal needs a device making the standard laxer, so that arguments (α) which should be insufficiently specified vis-à-vis the ‘normal’ standard become sufficiently specified, facilitating Agree; but $INT\uparrow$ only makes standards stricter. Dynamic interaction is thus the wrong kind of standard-changing.

5.2 Dynamic Feature Gluttony

However, *when combined with feature gluttony, dynamic interaction is exactly the right kind of standard-changing*; whence, DFG. This is because *feature gluttony* makes opposite assumptions to failed Agree about what counts as grammatical: in FG, failing to Agree with both arguments is grammatical, not ungrammatical; Agreeing with both is what yields ungrammaticality. Accordingly, to explain why configurations like Chamorro's $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0 >> 1$ are 'unexpectedly grammatical' in FG will require a device which makes Agree harder: specifically, we need to turn a configuration where 1_{IA} Agrees (and induces gluttony), into one where it does not. Otherwise put, we need a device which makes the 'standard' stricter – so that 1_{IA} cannot Agree, despite being *more featurally specified* than $2_{\text{EA}}/3'_{\text{EA}}/\dots$ with respect to the initial standard. From this perspective, dynamic interaction is perfect: $\text{INT}\uparrow$ do make the standard stricter, and so Agree harder. Take Chamorro's $>> 1$ again: we can assume that Agree with the EA activates some $\text{INT}\uparrow$; this adds a condition that 1_{IA} must meet to Agree; 1_{IA} lacks this feature, so cannot Agree – preventing gluttony, and so making $>> 1$ grammatical. Dynamic *feature gluttony* thus has the machinery to generate unexpectedly grammatical configurations, and so inertness; coupled with its compatibility with VUNCA (section 4.2), this thus solves both puzzles posed by Chamorro, promising a new, more descriptively adequate unified theory of PARs.

I formalise DFG as follows. For concreteness, I translate the basic FG architecture into interaction-and-satisfaction terms, like Hammerly (2020); though these are not used in precisely Deal's sense. First, I allow SAT to consist of sets of features, equivalent to the 'segments' of feature gluttony, with each feature satisfied independently. Second, as in FG, I assume a goal's whole person-geometry is copied back under Agree with a person-probe. The real amendment to standard FG is the appeal to INT. The notion of INT I adopt is a dilution of Deal's: instead of defining goals with which a non-fully-satisfied probe will always Agree, INT just define potential goals, with which the probe *only Agrees if they meet any of the probe's unsatisfied SAT*. So-construed, INT amount to visibility conditions on the probe. Following Baier (2018: 65ff), I assume ϕ -probes universally have initial $[\text{INT:F}]$, a superordinate feature encompassing both $[\phi]/[A']$; $\text{INT}\uparrow$ and SAT vary. Dynamic interaction conditions $[X\uparrow]$ are copied onto the probe under Agree with an $[X]$ -bearing goal, constraining goal-visibility thereafter.

PAR effects follow as in standard FG: $*\alpha >> \beta$, $\beta >> \alpha$ iff β is more featurally specified than α with respect to the probe, inducing gluttony, and no morphological repair applies; specifically, this means β meets the probe's INT and satisfies a superset of the SAT that α satisfies. Inertness then follows from dynamic interaction, as outlined above: for Chamorro, $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0 >> 1$ is expected to be ungrammatical because 1 is more featurally specified with respect to the initial standard; Agree with $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ activates some $[X\uparrow]$ which 1 lacks; this means 1 ceases to behave as 'more specified', so cannot Agree, preventing gluttony. In section 6, I propose that $[X\uparrow]$ is $[\text{SPECIFIC}\uparrow]$ in Chamorro.

6 DYNAMIC FEATURE GLUTTONY AND CHAMORRO

Finally, I provide a DFG analysis of Chamorro’s PAR: the following first presents preliminary assumptions (section 6.1), before implementing the analysis (section 6.2 and section 6.3).

6.1 Preliminary Assumptions

Chamorro monotransitives have the structure (22) at the point when Infl^0 probes, following Chung (2014).³ Infl^0 hosts the ϕ -probe underpinning subject/predicate-agreement; more accurately, it is Infl^0 ’s person-probe which induces the PAR (Coon & Keine 2021). Placing the ϕ -probe on Infl^0 explains agreement’s sensitivity to mood (being a T-domain property) and ensures it c-commands both arguments. Both EA/IA are accessible to Infl^0 , following the weak Phase Impenetrability Condition (Chomsky 2001). I adopt Chung’s 2017 analysis of case and nominal-licensing: EAs/IAs/possessors are all assigned ‘unmarked’ case, and licensed, under Agree with a functional-head (respectively, $\text{Infl}^0/V^0/D^0$); they therefore all bear a case which is accessible to Infl^0 ’s ϕ -probe (unmarked case must be accessible, because EAs trigger subject/predicate-agreement), a prerequisite for gluttony. Note, I thus do assume systematic covert object agreement with V^0 ; however, I assume neither additional agreement with Infl^0 (unlike FA) nor Infl^0 - V^0 feature-sharing (unlike Chung 2014). Following Deal (To Appear: 13–17), I eschew the Activity Condition, ensuring IAs/possessors remain active for Agree with Infl^0 .

$$(22) \quad [\text{CP}^0 [\text{InflP} \text{Infl}^0_{u\phi} [\text{vP} E A_{i\phi} [\text{v}^0 V^0 [\text{VP} V^0 I A_{i\phi}]]]]]$$

Infl^0 ’s person-probe has the specification (23).

$$(23) \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{SAT: } [\delta, \text{ANIM}, \pi, \text{PART}] \\ \text{INT: } [\mathcal{F}], \text{SPECIFIC}\uparrow \end{array}$$

These features correspond to the feature specifications I propose in Table 8 (represented as ‘geometries’ for convenience). Though nonstandard, they require only one assumption not advocated elsewhere.

The clusivity and local/non-local person distinctions are standard (Harley & Ritter 2002).

$[\pi]$ distinguishes animate pronouns from animate lexical nouns and all inanimates (3’ vs. 3’_{lexical/0}); this follows Sichel & Toosarvandani (in progress). S&T posit that, in Sierra Zapotec, $[\pi]$ distinguishes all pronouns from all lexical nouns; this is taken to explain why lexical noun EAs block cliticisation of pronoun IAs (*lexical-noun >> pronoun), because it makes pronouns more featurally specified with respect to the relevant probe, inducing a PAR effect. Crucially, however, S&T also anticipate cross-linguistic variation, such that $[\pi]$ is associated with all pronouns in some

³ The derivation of Chamorro’s predicate-initial word order is set aside here; see (Chung 2006) for discussion.

1EXCL	1INCL	2		3'		3' _{lexical}		0
δ	δ	δ		δ		δ		δ
		/ \		/ \		/ \		
ANIM	ANIM	ANIM	SPECIFIC	ANIM	SPECIFIC	ANIM	SPECIFIC	SPECIFIC
π	π	π		π				
PART	PART	PART						
	/ \							
AUTH	AUTH ADDR	ADDR						

Table 8 Chamorro argument feature specifications.

languages, but only animate pronouns in others [Sichel & Toosarvandani \(in progress: 18-19\)](#). I take Chamorro to instantiate the latter type; $[\pi]$ will then explain why animate pronouns disallow lexical EAs, $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > 3'$, again because possessing $[\pi]$ makes $3'$ more featurally specified.

Animates and inanimates are then distinguished by [ANIM]. A dedicated animacy feature of this sort is independently proposed elsewhere (e.g. [Lochbihler 2012](#), [Ojibwe](#)). That [ANIM] immediately dominates $[\pi]$ in the ‘geometry’ is analogous to [Oxford \(2022\)](#), where [ANIM] similarly immediately dominates the lowest feature distinguishing among 3rd-persons (Oxford’s ‘[PERSON]’). Finally, all nominals 1EXCL/1INCL/2/3'/3'_{lexical}/0 share $[\delta]$, taken to denote individuation ([Sichel & Toosarvandani in progress](#)). This again follows S&T, who motivate $[\delta]$ on the basis that lexical nouns can only intervene for pronouns, and so derive Sierra Zapotec’s $*\text{lexical-noun} > \text{pronoun}$ constraint, if they share some feature – $[\delta]$. In Chamorro, $[\delta]$ is used the same way, qua to explain how the least featurally specified argument, this time inanimates, can intervene for other arguments; i.e., $*0 > 2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}$.

This leaves only [SPECIFIC]. This is crucial; as above, [SPECIFIC] is the dynamic interaction condition which I use to derive 1I, assuming that 2/3'/3'_{lexical}/0 EAs always activate it, but 1 lacks it. I first motivate [SPECIFIC]’s presence, as a person-feature, in Chamorro, then (more speculatively) its role as the 1I-triggering INT $\uparrow$.

That [SPECIFIC]⁴ is active in Chamorro is assumed elsewhere ([Chung & Wagers 2021: 778ff](#)). As evidence, I offer the morphosyntactic reflexes of [Milsark \(1974\)](#) ‘weak’/‘strong’ nominal contrast.⁵ Like other languages, Chamorro allows only ‘weak’ nominals as pivots of existential predicates, and only ‘strong’ nominals as subjects of individual-level predicates ([Chung 2008: 196-198](#)); [Table 9](#) categorises these. Crucially, this distinction is associated with other morphosyntactic effects in Chamorro. Oblique arguments of intransitive verbs/adjectives, nominalised predicates and antipassive/applicative/causative verbs get (overt) oblique case only

⁴ Specificity’s semantics is notoriously contentious ([von Heusinger 2011](#)); I simply follow the cited authors’ – notably, [Chung & Wagers](#)’s – judgements regarding ‘specific’/‘nonspecific’.

⁵ Thanks to Sandy Chung (p.c.) for suggesting the potential relevance of this.

when strong (Chung 2020: 90-91) : compare the strong, oblique-marked i-phrase *ni salåppi* (where i and oblique-marker nu have coalesced), with the weak, non-oblique-marked bula-phrase, *bula na salåppi*, in the applicative (24). Moreover, when a weak possessed noun phrase takes a strong possessor, the possessor makes it pattern morphosyntactically as strong, becoming a licit subject for individual-level predicates – e.g. *amigu-ña si Julia*, headed by indefinite $\emptyset$ but with a strong, proper name possessor, is the subject of an individual-level predicate in (25) (Chung 2008: 204-207).

Strong	Weak
<i>i</i> (definite article)	$\emptyset$ (null indefinite article)
<i>un</i> (indefinite singular article)	<i>un</i> (indefinite singular article)
[some uses]	[some uses]
Demonstratives	Numerals
Some quantifiers: <i>kada</i> ('each'); <i>todu</i> ('all')	Some quantifiers: <i>bula</i> ('much, many'); <i>meggai</i> ('many'); <i>dídidí</i> ('few, not much'); <i>palu</i> ('some'); 'etc.'
Pronouns	
Proper names	

Table 9 Elements heading strong vs. weak nominals in Chamorro (Chung 2008: 196).

- (24) *In apåsi i patgun låhi {ni salåppi bula na salåppi}*
 1EXCL.PL.REAL pay the child male {OBL money much LNK money}
 'We (excl.) paid the boy the money/a lot of money.' (Chung 2020: 90)
- (25) *Chamoru amigu-ña si Julia*
 Chamorro friend-3SG.POSS UNM Julia
 'A friend of Julia's is Chamorro.' (Chung 2008: 205)

Insofar as these effects are syntactic, they should involve some formal feature. I propose [SPECIFIC] (as Chung, p.c., suggests). For one, note the close correspondence between 'strong' nominals, and nominals which pattern as specific with respect to Chamorro's EA 'specificity restriction', which requires that EAs always be semantically specific (Chung 1998: 112ff); see Table 10. Only *palu*-phrases and numerals, patterning as specific but morphosyntactically weak (so non-[SPECIFIC], ex hypothesi), pattern unexpectedly. Since in section 7 I analyse the specificity restriction as involving semantic specificity, not formal [SPECIFIC], this nonisomorphism need not be problematic: mismatches between, e.g., semantic vs. formal animacy are well-attested (Wiltschko & Ritter 2015: 899-902); and I independently

require a mismatch for 1st-person, since it patterns as semantically specific for the EA restriction but, I argue, lacks [SPECIFIC]. Thus, I assume Chamorro has [SPECIFIC].

Specific nominals
<i>i</i>
<i>un</i>
Demonstratives
Numerals
<i>palu, kada</i> (on partitive readings),
<i>todu</i> (on partitive readings)
Pronouns
Proper names

Table 10 Elements heading specific nominals in Chamorro (Chung 2020: 193).

That [SPECIFIC] is a person-feature, qua a dependent of the highest node in the person-‘geometry’, follows Béjar (2003: 48-50), Carvalho (2017). That specificity can trigger PARs, like person and unlike number/gender (Stegovec 2019), is also suggestive for the relatedness of person/specificity; especially since Toosarvandani (2022) takes features capable of triggering PARs to be precisely those composing on the same head as person, so plausibly occupying the same geometry.

Using [SPECIFIC] as the INT $\uparrow$ underlying 1I, because 2/3’/3’_{lexical}/0 bear it but 1 does not, is more speculative. I offer three arguments that it is at least plausible: from parsimony, acquisition and generic pronouns. The parsimony argument is that [SPECIFIC] *already has two properties we need the 1I-deriving INT $\uparrow$ to have*, so using it to derive 1I is most parsimonious. First, to explain why 1_{IA} is always inert for any EA, we need the INT $\uparrow$ to always be activated by EAs. [SPECIFIC] plausibly meets this in Chamorro, given the EA specificity restriction discussed above. Although, as noted, I take this restriction to ultimately be about semantic specificity rather than [SPECIFIC], it is reasonable to assume that any arguments contrastively specified for [SPECIFIC] will nonetheless bear [SPECIFIC] when they are EAs, given we expect semantic/formal specificity to more-or-less align, where possible. Accordingly, for all 2/3’/3’_{lexical}/0 > > 1, the EA bears [SPECIFIC], as desired. The second requirement is that, whatever the INT $\uparrow$ is, any other arguments independently assumed to lack that feature should also not trigger PAR effects when occurring as IAs, because INT $\uparrow$ will make them inaccessible to Agree. As below, nonspecific IAs are rare in Chamorro; crucially, in at least two contexts where they are discussed, they appear to be ignored for the PAR, as desired. This independently suggests that [SPECIFIC] must be an INT on the probe – as Chung & Wagers (2021: 778-7779) assume (albeit, formalised differently) – strengthening the parsimony argument that [SPECIFIC $\uparrow$] explains 1I.

The argument from acquisition is that formal specificity is acquired early in child language acquisition: e.g. Russian's specificity-based verb-object/object-verb alternation is acquired by 1;7 (Avrutin & Brun 2001), and Swahili's specificity-based object-agreement by 1;10 (Deen 2005). Insofar as this means [SPECIFIC] is present early in grammar-development, it may be particularly susceptible to 'recycling'; so a plausible candidate for the INT↑ a child-learner might posit when acquiring Chamorro's PAR (Biberauer 2019, Douglas 2018)). The third and most direct argument for using [SPECIFIC] to model 1I is from generic pronouns. Carvalho (2017: 79-81) takes referential vs. generic uses of pronouns to derive from the presence vs. absence of [SPECIFIC]. Accordingly, it is suggestive that – though generic pronouns are sparingly discussed – at least Cooreman (1987) gives (26) as evidence that 2nd-person pronouns may be used generically in Chamorro, but no prior literature suggests 1st-person can.⁶ This implies that only 2nd-person (plus 3rd-persons, as standard) requires contrastively specified [SPECIFIC]. 1st-person (singular/exclusive/inclusive) could be unspecified, being inherently specific (Béjar 2000: 57); particularly since similar syntax/semantics mismatches are independently required for other PARs, e.g. 1/2 are inherently animate, but do not participate in Tzotzil's *Inanimate>>Animate restriction, so must be unspecified for [ANIM] (Aissen 1997).

- (26) *Pues ha na'-mutta háão.*
 then 3SG.REAL CAUS-fine you

'And then they (=police) fined you.' (Cooreman 1987: 97)⁷


6.2 Analysis

These assumptions derive Chamorro's PAR.

Consider first configurations with local (1EXCL/1INCL/2>>) EAs. As exemplified by 1EXCL>>2 in (27), since 1EXCL/1INCL/2 all bear [δ ,ANIM, π ,PART], the EA will satisfy all of Infl⁰'s SAT in these configurations – indicated in (27) by the arrows next to each SAT, showing they are satisfied by the argument represented as ①, qua EA. The probe consequently stops searching, bleeding Agree with the IA, so preventing gluttony.

⁶ Chung (p.c.) states that her 'impression is that 2nd person and 1st person inclusive plural pronouns can be used generically' (emphasis JM). This would be problematic, insofar as it would also imply contrastive specification of [SPECIFIC] in 1INpl. Determining genericity's distribution is an important future task.


(27)




This leaves only configurations with 3rd-person EAs. Consider first the grammatical configurations; I exemplify with $3' > 3'_{\text{lexical}}$ in (28). Both arguments bear $[\mathcal{F}]$; we can also assume both bear [SPECIFIC] (see above on EAs; see below on (non)specific IAs). Therefore, the probe Agrees with $3'_{EA}$, satisfying $[\delta, \text{ANIM}, \pi]$ and activating [SPECIFIC $\uparrow$], (28a). Since $3'_{\text{lexical}}\text{-IA}$ bears [F, SPECIFIC], it is visible to, so searched by, the probe (indicated by the blue arrow, (28b)). However, since $3'_{\text{lexical}}\text{-IA}$ does not meet the remaining SAT, [PART], no features are copied (the red arrow). Gluttony therefore does not arise, whence grammaticality.

The critical observation is that the EA/IA's feature-specifications exhibit a superset/subset relation: of the probe's SAT, EA satisfies a superset of that which IA can. Hence, IA does not trigger Agree and gluttony. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the other grammatical 3rd-person EA configurations ($3' > 0$, $3'_{\text{lexical}} > 0$), and configurations with the same type of EA/IA ($1 > 1$, $2 > 2$, etc.).

(28) a.




b.




Ungrammatical configurations result when the relationship is reversed: the IA satisfies a superset of the features the EA satisfies – qua, the IA is more featurally specified relative to the probe than the EA. Consider $*3' > 2$, (29a and 29b). Again, both $3'_{EA}/2'_{EA}$ bear [F, SPECIFIC]. $3'_{EA}$ satisfies $[\delta, ANIM, \pi]$, leaving [PART] unsatisfied, (29a). Crucially, 2IA can satisfy [PART], so has its features copied back to the probe (indicated by ② next to [PART], (29b). This yields gluttony: the probe ends up with both $3'_{EA}/2IA$'s person-features, yielding the specification (30).


(29) a.



b.



(30)



Ungrammaticality then arises in Vocabulary Insertion. Assume the VIs in Table 11, and constraints - (17a and 17b) above. To ensure that the maximally specific VI is inserted for each feature value (constraint-17a), we need both *ha* (for $3'_{EA}$'s feature value) and *un* (2_{IA}) to be inserted – violating constraint-(17b), requiring that only one VI be inserted. Whence, ineffability and ungrammaticality. The same holds for $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 2$, $*0 > > 2$.

$hu \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{AUTH}]]]]/\text{---}[\text{SG}]$	$ta \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{AUTH}, \text{ADDR}]]]]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$
$un \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi[\text{PART}]]]]/\text{---}[\text{SG}]$	$en \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi[\text{PART}]]]]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$
$ha \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi]]]/\text{---}[\text{SG}]$	$ma \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi]]]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$
$ha \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}]]/\text{---}[\text{SG}]$	$ma \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}]]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$
$ha \Leftrightarrow [\delta]/\text{---}[\text{SG}]$	$ma \Leftrightarrow [\delta]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$
$in \Leftrightarrow [\delta[\text{ANIM}[\pi[\text{PART}[\text{AUTH}]]]]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$	$ma \Leftrightarrow [\delta]/\text{---}[\text{PL}]$


Table 11 Vocabulary items for realis transitive subject/predicate-agreement in Chamorro.

The other ungrammatical configurations ($*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 3'$, $*0 > > 3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}$) are more complicated. $3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ trigger homophonous agreement: singular *ha*, plural *ma*. If this meant there were only one VI for *ha/ma*, then (following Coon & Keine 2021: 698-699), no combination of $3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ should ever induce ineffability in Vocabulary Insertion. Even when the probe is gluttonous, (where they match for singular/plural) $3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ feature values will always require the same maximally specific VI; consequently, only one VI would need to be inserted, meeting both constraints-(17a and 17b), and so preventing ineffability. To avoid this, I postulate three distinct VIs for *ha/ma*, maximally specified for $3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}/0$ respectively. This explains why $*3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 3'$, $*0 > > 3'/3'_{\text{lexical}}$ are still ungrammatical, because each feature value will require a different (albeit homophonous) VI, yielding ineffability because two VIs cannot be inserted simultaneously (Coon & Keine 2021). This is clearly stipulative; though absent an alternative which explains VUNCA (section 4.2), the stipulation is necessary. Note, syncretism failing to rescue gluttony in this way is also independently motivated, for Icelandic at least. Coon & Keine (2021) analyse Icelandic's PAR in dative-nominative constructions using FG, and argue that it is voided in $3\text{PL} > > 2\text{PL}$ configurations when $3\text{PL}/2\text{PL}$ are syncretic: $2\text{PL}/3\text{PL}$ trigger the same underspecified VI, removing the conflict between constraints-(17a and 17b), preventing ineffability. However, Hartmann & Heycock (2022) show that for a majority of Icelandic speakers, syncretism does not void the PAR. To explain this, it must be that these speakers thus have distinct, accidentally homophonous VIs for $3\text{PL}/2\text{PL}$; and that these still induce ineffability, despite their homophony – lending credence to my analysis.


The foregoing leaves only $> > 1$ configurations. Take $0 > > 1\text{EXCL}$, (31a and 31b); the same holds of $0 > > 1\text{INCL}$ and $2/3'/3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 1\text{EXCL}/1\text{INCL}$, mutatis mutandis. The person-probe Agrees with 0_{EA} , satisfying $[\delta]$, leaving $[\text{ANIM}, \pi, \text{PART}]$ unsatisfied; see (31a). Crucially, 0_{EA} bears $[\text{SPECIFIC}]$ (like all contrastively specified EAs),

so activates [SPECIFIC↑] on the probe. Since 1_{IA} , ex hypothesi, lacks [SPECIFIC], this renders it inaccessible to the person-probe, meaning it cannot be Agreed with; see (31b). Gluttony does not arise, so the configuration is grammatical. To return to the terminology used throughout, the reason $1 > >$ and $> > 1$ are both grammatical is that the standard against which 1's degree-of-specification is measured – the probe-specification – changes: for $1 > >$, 1_{EA} is measured against the initial person-probe, before [SPECIFIC↑] is added, and is maximally specified – satisfying the probe and preventing gluttony; but for $> > 1$, 1_{IA} is measured against the person-probe after [SPECIFIC↑] is added, and relative to this probe is minimally specified, being unable to Agree with it at all. This explains 1I.

(31) a.



b.



DFG thus derives the full distribution of Chamorro's PAR.

Note a further prediction: any other non-[SPECIFIC]-bearing IAs should also fail to trigger gluttony. Two observations provide suggestive evidence that this holds. First, nonspecific IAs are at least heavily dispreferred in Chamorro. Cooreman (1988: 570:571) asserts that antipassivisation is 'obligatory in the case of indefinite or generic objects', and specifically 'must be used when the specific identity of the Object referent is not known' Cooreman (1988: 587). If we define specific arguments as 'specify[ing] a referential argument', following Chung (1998: 112), then Cooreman's assertion entails that antipassivisation is obligatory with nonspecific IAs – ruling out nonspecific IAs in simple transitives. (Chung 2020: 223) dilutes this to a 'strong preference', the transitive being 'considerably less common' with nonspecific IAs; Chung (p.c.) adds that, though at least *nisisita* 'need' does 'routinely take a

nonspecific/indefinite direct object’,⁸ antipassive is elsewhere ‘clearly the preferred option’. Whatever explains this restriction, it augurs well for my analysis, insofar as limited evidence for PAR-avoidance in ‘specific>>nonspecific’ contexts follows straightforwardly from their being dispreferred, so plausibly under-represented.

Second, in the contexts where nonspecific IAs are systematically attested/discussed in the literature, they seemingly pattern consistent with my analysis. Consider first possessed DPs headed by the null indefinite/nonspecific article. These DPs have two special properties vis-à-vis other possessed DPs: they allow the possessor to occupy the nominal left-edge, which Chung (2014: 16-17) analyses as movement to spec-DP; and their features are apparently ignored by the PAR – the PAR is instead calculated between EA and possessor (Chung & Wagers 2021: 778ff). For example, (32) involves a $3'_{\text{lexicalEA}} >> 3'_{\text{lexicalIA}}$ configuration; but this is ungrammatical, because the possessor is 2nd-person – producing $*3'_{\text{lexicalEA}} >> 2\text{POSS}$. This is as predicted.


- (32) **Kao ha fāhan si Antonio karetā-mu nigap?*
 Q 3SG.REAL buy UNM Antonio car-2SG.POSS yesterday
 ‘Did Antonio buy your car yesterday?’ (Chung 2014: 778)

Agreeing with $3'_{\text{lexical}}\text{-EA}$ values [δ ,ANIM] and activates [SPECIFIC $\uparrow$], (33a). Because [SPECIFIC $\uparrow$] is activated, the person-probe will be unable to Agree with $3'_{\text{lexicalIA}}$, because (being nonspecific, qua headed by the null indefinite/nonspecific article) it lacks [SPECIFIC], (33a). Since the possessor raises to spec-DP in nonspecific DPs (via some edge-feature on non-[SPECIFIC]-bearing D^0), it escapes the DP phase, so is accessible to Infl^0 . Crucially, since 2POSS can satisfy the as-yet-unsatisfied conditions [π ,PART], it triggers Agree, (33c) – yielding gluttony, and ungrammaticality.


This closely resembles Chung & Wagers (2021), except that they (implicitly) treat [SPECIFIC] as a constant, not dynamic, INT. Note, though, given nonspecific IAs are also the only IAs in which possessors can move to spec-DP, (32) has an alternative explanation: possessors are only high enough to be accessible to Infl^0 when the IA is nonspecific – hence why they only then contribute to the PAR.


⁸ Note, *nisisita* is one of a ‘handful of transitive verbs’ that cannot antipassivise (Chung 2020: 227): this suggests some syntactic property of *nisisita* may explain its exceptional licensing of nonspecific IAs. I am unaware of evidence about its behaviour with the PAR

(33) a.



b.





Thus, (32) is only negative evidence for my analysis. The crucial extra prediction is that, where it is $EA > IA$ which is PAR-violating, not $EA > POSS$, the result should be grammatical – because non-[SPECIFIC]-bearing IA cannot Agree with, so trigger gluttony on, Infl^0 . The data here is scarce, and somewhat unclear. Absent pronominal possessed DPs, the only configuration we can test is $0_{EA} > > 3'_{\text{lexical}} - IA > > 0_{POSS}$.

Chung (p.c.) states that the two speakers she consulted rejected sentences of this type. However, their judgements on comparable sentences ‘were not consistent overall’, suggesting other factors may be at issue. For example, one speaker rejected comparable examples with a specific/definite IA too, but the other accepted some. Chung (p.c.) also notes that this may at least partly follow from the difficulty of constructing naturalistic examples with 0_{EA} at all, particularly where 0_{EA} has no ‘alternative construal as animate’.⁹ Given these problems, I will assume current evidence remains at least compatible with my analysis, pending further research; and if we follow Chung & Wagers (2021) in (implicitly) assuming that nonspecific IAs do never contribute to the PAR, then we in fact have strong evidence for my analysis.

The second context with a nonspecific IA is the generic pronoun, (26). This involves $3' > > 2$, but is grammatical, because generic pronouns lack [SPECIFIC] (following Carvalho 2017) so cannot Agree with the person-probe when occurring as IAs – preventing gluttony. This strongly endorses the [SPECIFIC↑] analysis.

6.3 Voidance Contexts

Finally, I address the voidance contexts (leaving one, possessor-agreement verbs, to future work).

6.3.1 Infinitives

Voidance in infinitival-clauses follows from Infl^0 bearing no ϕ -probe, so not performing Agree – hence, not triggering gluttony.

6.3.2 Reflexives

Though overlooked above because it lacks ‘non-canonical agreement’, reflexive IAs are a further PAR-voiding context: $3'_{\text{lexical}} > > 3'$ is fine in (34), because $3'$ IA is reflexive

- (34) *Ha bāgai gui' neni ni sabanas*
 3SG.REAL wrap him(self) baby OBL blanket

‘The baby wrapped himself with the blanket.’ (Chung 2020: 357)

This reduces to the Anaphor Agreement Effect (Rizzi 1990): as cross-linguistically, reflexive IAs in Chamorro cannot undergo ϕ -Agree; specifically, following (Preminger 2021), I assume reflexives possess a ‘ ϕ -encapsulating’ *AnaphP* layer, rendering their ϕ -features inaccessible to Agree. Consequently, gluttony cannot arise, voiding the PAR.

⁹ This also problematises testing whether nonpronominal possessors contribute to the PAR, because this also requires 0_{EA} ($0_{EA} > > 3'_{\text{lexical}}$ POSS).

6.3.3 Subject WH-Agreement

I treat subject wh-agreement as A'-sensitive ϕ -impoverishment, involving the impoverishment rule (35) (broadly following Baier's 2018 notation): $[\phi]$ is deleted in the context of an $[A']$ -bearing Infl^0 which also bears [Realis], [Transitive]¹⁰ (whence subject wh-agreement's absence in intransitives and irrealis transitives).

$$(35) \quad [\Phi] \rightarrow \emptyset / [\text{---}, A', \text{Agr}, \text{Infl}, \text{Realis}, \text{Transitive}]$$

This voids the PAR, because it deletes the ϕ -features of gluttonous probes before Vocabulary Insertion, bleeding any conflict between those features in Vocabulary Insertion, so preventing ungrammaticality. I assume *-um-* is the maximally underspecified VI for Infl^0 , i.e. Infl^0 without ϕ -features (plausibly explaining *-um-*'s appearance with infinitival Infl^0 , too).

6.3.4 Object WH-Agreement

Object wh-agreement, conversely, cannot reduce to impoverishment; I analyse it, following Aldridge (2017), as involving syntactic predicate-nominalisation. This explains its various syntactic effects: demoting the IA from unmarked to oblique case is expected, since Chamorro's nominal predicates do not allow unmarked IAs; it also predicts the occurrence of nominalising marker *-in-*, and is consistent with the suffixal 'possessor-agreement', since it occurs only on nouns otherwise. PAR-avoidance then results from demoting the IA to oblique. Specifically, I assume oblique arguments are inaccessible to the ϕ -probe, preventing gluttony, and so ungrammaticality: either because obliques' ϕ -features are rendered inaccessible by additional functional structure; or Infl^0 is case-discriminating, disallowing oblique goals.

7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This paper has argued that Chamorro's person-animacy restriction mandates a new theory of PARs, dynamic feature gluttony. I have made four contributions. First, I contended, pace Chung (1998, 2014), that Chamorro's PAR is not a language-specific morphological restriction, but should derive from a unified, syntactic theory of PARs. Second, however, I showed that no current theory suffices, because of two properties of Chamorro's PAR: 1st-person inertness and avoidance under non-canonical agreement. VUNCA is incompatible with strictly syntactic approaches, but consistent with (so novel evidence for) a recent alternative, Coon & Keine's 2021 feature gluttony. Crucially, neither explains 1I. I formalised the Inertness Paradox, and showed almost all theories to incur it because of two (generally implicit) assumptions. I then identified an abstract property which helps avoid the Paradox – 'standard-changing' – but demonstrated that the theories which have it, Stegovec (2019) and Deal (2022), fail independently. Third, this motivated

¹⁰ (35) assumes that Infl^0 can bear [Transitive]. Alternatively, the rule could be conditioned by having $\text{v}_{\text{transitive}}^0$ as its adjacent head (see Oxford 2019), removing the need for [Transitive] on Infl^0 .

my proposal of dynamic feature gluttony. DFG takes FG – explaining VUNCA – and endows it with ‘standard-changing’ machinery, dynamic interaction (Deal 2022), to explain 1I. Finally, I derived Chamorro’s PAR, and its avoidance contexts. This required DFG, combined with feature specifications entailing one new claim: [SPECIFIC] is specified on 2/3’/3’_{lexical}/0, but unspecified on 1, in Chamorro.

I now briefly consider three broader implications. First, my work has repercussions for Chamorro’s EA specificity restriction. I assume this involves ‘H-specificity’, echoing Wiltschko & Ritter’s 2015 ‘H-animacy’ (and following Chung’s 1998 semantic-pragmatic account): semantically specific arguments (including 1st-person) bear an H-index ensuring specific reference; vtransitive⁰ selects for an H-index–bearing argument, hence EAs are obligatorily specific. Given my analysis of Chamorro’s PAR, formal specificity qua [SPECIFIC] (‘m(orphological)-specificity’, in W&R’s terms) must mismatch H-specificity – e.g., 1 is H-specific but non-[SPECIFIC]-bearing; this is independently expected, given W&R’s evidence that H-/m-animacy mismatch in Blackfoot.

Second, more broadly, the analysis advanced here calls for re-evaluating PARs with inertness more generally. If Chamorro’s PAR can follow from a unified theory of PARs, then other inertness effects may too. Halkomelem and Squamish, for example, have similar PARs to Chamorro, with the hierarchy 2>3>3_{lexical} (i.e. Chamorro’s minus the animacy contrast, so all pronouns outrank non-pronouns; Wiltschko 2008). Since this obeys the PAH and has Chamorro-like avoidance contexts, e.g. wh-agreement, a syntactic reanalysis seems plausible. This re-evaluation will also inform the broader typology of inertness. 1I has been identified in multiple languages, but 2nd-person/3rd-person inertness (2I/3I) are less clear. Some underdiscussed evidence for 3I in person restrictions comes from some Romanian speakers’ *2>>1 restriction (Ciucivara 2006), and Nez Perce’s inverse triggered by only 2>>1 (Rude 1997); 2I is apparently unattested, though Stegovec (2019: 337) argues this result from insufficient sampling. I am unaware of evidence for 2I/3I in PARs with richer hierarchies beyond person, like Chamorro. Establishing this typology will inform constraints on DFG, and ultimately the typology of features which can act as INT↑ generating inertness.

1st-person	2nd-person	3rd-person
π	π	π
PART	PART	
AUTH	ADDR	

Table 12 Deal’s 2022: 30ff person feature-system.

Finally, I offer a brief proof-of-concept for DFG: using the same logic as for Chamorro’s analysis above, Table 13 presents the set of person restrictions DFG

generates given every SAT/INT $\uparrow$ combination using the feature-system Deal (2022) adopts in evaluating her theory’s predictions (Table 12). Note, their predicted PR typology is what most previous theories judge themselves on.

Satisfaction Conditions								
Dynamic Interaction Conditions	$[-]$	π	(π), PART	(π), PART, AUTH	(π), PART, ADDR	(π), PART, AUTH, ADDR	(π), AUTH	(π), ADDR
		Flat	Weak	Strictly-descending	A-descending	Strong	Me-first	You-first
	$\pi\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Strictly-descending	A-descending	Strong	Me-first	You-first
	($\pi\uparrow$), PART $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Strictly-descending	A-descending	Strong	Me-first	You-first
	($\pi\uparrow$), PART $\uparrow$, AUTH $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Strictly-descending	Weak	Strictly-descending	Me-first	*3>>2
	($\pi\uparrow$), PART $\uparrow$, ADDR $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Weak	A-descending	A-descending	*3>>1	You-first
	($\pi\uparrow$), AUTH $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Strictly-descending	Weak	Strictly-descending	Me-first	*3>>2
	($\pi\uparrow$), ADDR $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Weak	A-descending	A-descending	*3>>1	You-first
	($\pi\uparrow$), AUTH $\uparrow$, ADDR $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	*3>>1	*3>>2
	($\pi\uparrow$), PART $\uparrow$, AUTH $\uparrow$, ADDR $\uparrow$	Flat	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	*3>>1	*3>>2

Table 13 Predicted person restrictions in dynamic feature gluttony. ¹¹¹²

DFG’s typology is highly restrictive: it generates the six standard PRs (Table 2), diverging from Deal (2022) only in generating *3>>2 (a PR with inert 1st-person) and *3>>1 (inert 2nd-person), both of which Stegovec (2019) also predicts. *3>>2 may occur in Nuxalk (Forrest 1994, Stegovec 2019); that *3>>1 is unattested may result from sampling limitations (ibid:337). This typology nonetheless needs expanding: for example, non-person features should be added, to allow for PARs beyond just person; and, pending a better understanding of their typology, more features responsible for inertness effects, like [SPECIFIC], must also be added. Absent space, I leave this to future research.

¹² Note, [π] in Table 13 is of the Sierra Zapotec type (section 6.2): [π] occurs on all pronouns. This is different from Chamorro, as noted above, where [π] is only on animate pronouns. Insofar as both types are required cross-linguistically (Sichel & Toosarvandani in progress: 18-19), a fuller typology of PARs will require incorporating both.

¹² SAT can ‘skip’ features in entailment relations (e.g. [π ,AUTH], skipping [PART]), following Hammerly (2020). (π) is parenthesised because adding/omitting it generates the same PR.

ABBREVIATIONS

1	1st-person	LNK	linker
1EXCL	1st-person exclusive	OBL	oblique case
1INCL	1st-person inclusive	PASS	passive
2	2nd-person	PL	plural
3	3rd-person	POSS	possessor agreement
3'	3rd-person animate pronouns only	Q	question particle
3' _{lexical}	3rd-person animate lexical nouns only	REAL	realis
0	3rd-person inanimate pronouns and lexical nouns only	SG	singular
CAUS	causative	UNM	unmarked case
FUT	future	WH[SUBJ]/WH[OBJ]	subject/object wh-agreement
INF	infinitive	'X>Y'	'X outranks Y on a descriptive person-animacy hierarchy'
IRR	irrealis	'X>>Y'	'X is the syntactically-higher argument in a configuration of two arguments X, Y'
LCL	local case		

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